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THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE AS IF.
BY THE EDITOR.
A WORK bearing the above title has recently appeared in Ger-many/ It was originally prepared in the years 1875-1878, but the
author considers that the present is a much more appropriate time
for its appearance, and thinks the world is more ready to receive
it than would have been the case a generation ago. As causes which
have prepared the way for its appreciation the preface enumerates
the voluntarism of Wundt, the biological epistemology of Mach and
xAvenarius, the philosophy of Nietzsche, and pragmatism, especially
the original pragmatism of Peirce. Strangely enough the author's
name is not mentioned, but the work has ben carefully edited and
prepared by Dr. H. Vaihinger, of Halle, the editor of Kantstndien,
a philosophical periodical dedicated to Kant and Kantian literature.
Here is set forth a species of pragmatism which is a decided im-
provement on the current pragmatism with its new though very
hazy conception of truth, and the proposition that certain statements
of truth are not exact but are to be understood allegorically is
mainly true of religion. It is the more interesting to find this
development of modern thought because its publication has been
anticipated by the editor of The Monist, who used the very same
term "as if" in discussions of the soul, of God, and of things, and
of concrete units in mathematics as well as in the real world. The
passages on this subject may be found in an article on "The Soul
in Science and Religion" with special reference to Fechner. See
The Monist, April, 1906, page 252, where Fechner's soul-conception
is given thus : "His view though untenable in its literal meaning,
is as if true ; it incorporates a truth that is significant and that should
not be denied." (The italics are in the original text.)
In the same way numbers are not real things. They are fic-
^ Die Philosophie des Als Ob. Berlin, Reuther & Reichard, 1911.
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titious units and in applying them to real life we can use them and
they serve their purpose as if they were true units. The idea of a
unit is a fiction. Units act as if they were real.- The same is true
of God. God is not an individual being, a ruler of the world, but
when the prophets speak of him in this humanized conception the
idea of God as a human personality is as if it were true, an idea
fully brought out in the writer's book, God, an Inquiry and a Solu-
tion.^
The same is true of Kant's idea of things-in-themselves. All
things are fleeting combinations not to be separated from their sur-
roundings of which they form parts, but when treating things as if
they were things-in-themselves this idea is for certain purposes
as if it were true. The author of the present work has made of this
idea of the as if a whole system of philosophy, and places on the
title page a motto by F. A. Lange, who says "I am convinced that
the point urged here shall become a corner-stone of philosophical
epistemology," but in this contention we fear our author goes too
far. We grant, as urged in the book The Surd of Metaphysics (An
Inquiry into the Nature of Things-in-Themselves) that even science
has its mythology, or in other words that certain events in nature
are first comprehended by analogies which are only imperfectly cor-
rect. We speak of electric currents as if electricity were a fluid
which runs along like a river, whereas in truth it is the transmission
of waves while the particles moved remain in place ; and there are
many other analogies in science which are not quite so, but they
are as if they were so, and for the time being the allegory is suffi-
cient to form ideas which in a limited way are correct and can serve
as guides for certain practical purposes. For that reason, however,
we must always bear in mind that all comprehension through anal-
ogy by statements representing half-known processes under the
fiction as if they were like other processes better known to us, is not
an ultimate, and science must not halt before the philosophy of the
"as if." Important though the idea is, it should not be regarded as
the corner-stone of cognition.
The book before us is anonymous ; it is edited by Professor
Vaihinger ; but we may be pardoned when we state that the editor
appears to be the author himself. Having written the book years
ago, it has become to him the work of another, of his former self,
and having changed his modes of thought, he felt that either he
^ See Cams, The Fouiidafioiis of MatJicniatics, p. 79.
^ Chicago, Open Court Publishing Company, 1908.
THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE AS IF. 563
had to let the book stand as written or he should rewrite it all.
He preferred the former course and acted as the editor of the lucu-
brations of his younger years.
Dr. \'aihinger's book contains many interesting chapters, and
considering its enormous bulk it may be desirable to publish an
outline of the main ideas.
The first chapter is a general introduction and conceives thought
as being viewed from the view-point of a teleological organic func-
tion. It is an art, and thus the author considers logic as the doctrine
of an art, which however should not be confused with artifices.
Here he sees the foundation of the nature of fictions of thought.
The first part is the foundation of the author's principle. He dis-
tinguishes between abstract or negative fictions, schematic, paradig-
matic, utopic and typic fictions, symbolic fictions (fictions by anal-
ogy) juridical fictions, personific fictions, summatory fictions, heur-
istic fictions, practical and ethical fictions, mathematical fictions,
methods of abstract generalization, the concepts of the infinite, mat-
ter and the world of sense, the atom as a fiction, fictions of mechan-
ics and mathematical fictions, and the Absolute.
After these preparations he propounds his logical theory of
scientific fictions (pages 123 to 230). He points out the difiference
between fiction and hypothesis, and analyses his idea of the "as if."
In Chapter XXIII our author collects a number of synonyms
for the word "fiction" which characterize the "as if." On page 169
he speaks of Eydichtnngen, Einbildnngcn, Hirngcspinste, Phantasicn,
phantastiscJic Bcgriffe, Imagination, iniagindrc Begriife. He dis-
cusses the characteristics of fictions and proposes a general theory
of fictitious conceptions. Further he enters into the methods of
correcting arbitrary dififerences by making opposite mistakes. In
Chapter XXVII he formulates a law of transition of ideas and their
development from hypothesis to dogma, from dogma to fiction, and
other transformations in the process of thinking. In discussing
the history of fictions he devotes a chapter to fictions in the scien-
tific practice of ancient Greece and Rome, which leads him to the
significance of the terminology of the Middle Ages and the appli-
cation of fiction in modern times. In referring to epistemological
conclusions he devotes a chapter to the epistemological problems bv
saying that thought falsifies reality through deductions and addi-
tions. The problem originates that while we deal with thought in a
falsified reality, thought after all agrees with reality. Dogmatism
which identifies the falsified nature of thought with existence itself is
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logical optimism. Skepticism however is logical pessimism. The
solution of the difficulty lies in the establishment of a logical criti-
cism. The categories are fictions but there is a good purpose in these
categorical fictions.
The second part (pages 328 to 612) points out that the use of
natural classification is not always sufficient and must be supplanted
by artificial classification. The author finds examples in Adam
Smith's and Bentham's methods of national economy and also in
the methods of physics and psychics. Steinthal's idea of a speech-
less man (homo alahis) is used as an instance of how the fiction de-
velops into an hypothesis. Other instances are the fictions of en
ergy ; the fictions of matter and materialism and all other abstract
conceptions ; the fiction of atomism and of mathematical physics ; the
fiction of absolute space, of the notions of the plane, the line, the
point, of the infinitesimal ; the fictitious judgment, and fiction in
contrast to hypothesis.
The third part is devoted to historical investigations, in which
Kant takes the lead and is followed by an appreciation of the views
of Forberg, F. A. Lange and Nietzsche.
